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Argument 
I. Corey's reliance upon this Court's prior guidance regarding a 
district court's discretion concerning probation is misplaced given 
Corey's misappropriation 
Corey relies upon the Court's decision in In re Discipline of Crawley, 2007 
UT 44, 164 P.3d 1232, to suggest that the district court had the discretion to stay 
Corey's three-year suspension and instead impose a probationary period. 
Appellee's Brief at 30-32. The OPC disagrees with that position for several 
reasons. 
First, the facts which led to Crawley's discipline are significantly different 
than the facts which support Corey's discipline. Most importantly, Crawley did not 
involve the misappropriation of client money. Steven Crawley's misconduct was 
based upon his actions in two matters regarding one client, Interwest 
Construction ("Interwest"). Crawley, at 1]3. In the first matter, Crawley failed to 
obtain an affidavit or expert report which would have aided Interwest in defending 
a claim and pursuing its three third-party claims. As a result, Interwest lost some 
of its third-party claims for lack of evidence and the district court assessed 
attorney fees against it. Id. The court later granted summary judgment against 
Interwest. Crawley failed to inform his client of these details, and failed to 
disclose the actual status of the case to his firm. Id. 
The second matter in Crawley also involved Interwest. Again, Crawley 
failed to obtain an affidavit or expert report, and Interwest lost its negligence 
counter-claim on summary judgment. Id. at 1|4. Crawley misrepresented to 
Interwest the reasons why it lost the counter-claim. The court later entered an 
amended judgment against Interwest which Crawley stated the firm would 
appeal, but no appeal was ever filed. Id. Crawley also filled out the firm's 
malpractice insurance renewal forms, and did not disclose his mishandling of the 
Interwest matters. Id. at j[5. 
The district court concluded that Crawley violated Rules 1.1 
(Competence), 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) 
(Communication), and 8.4(a) and (c) (Misconduct). Id. at 1J6. After weighing the 
aggravating and mitigation factors the district court imposed a one-year 
suspension but then stayed the suspension in favor of eighteen months of 
probation. Id. at ^[7. The OPC appealed that decision, and asked this Court to 
review the district court's ruling and provide general guidance regarding the use 
of probation in the disciplinary system. 
This Court opined that it was pleased with how district court judges 
exercised their discretion in sanctioning attorneys for misconduct, and elected 
not to adopt the OPC's proposed guidelines for the use of probation. Id. at ^[22. 
Corey relies upon Crawley to suggest that the district court in the present matter 
properly exercised its discretion when it stayed Corey's three-year suspension 
and imposed a probationary period. Appellee's Brief at 30-32. 
The facts underlying Corey's misconduct involve the misappropriation of 
client money. See Appellant's Brief at 4-7. Though Crawley involved some 
dishonesty (he wasn't forthcoming to Interwest, his firm, or the malpractice 
insurance provider), it did not involve the misappropriation of client funds. As the 
OPC argues in our opening brief, the seriousness of misappropriation cases 
2 
does remove some of the discretion that a district court judge may have when 
considering misconduct that does not involve misappropriation. The Crawley 
decision would only be applicable to this case were it not a case of presumptive 
disbarment for the misappropriation of client funds. As this Court has consistently 
ruled, misappropriation is the most serious of all attorney misconduct. It would be 
inconsistent to allow a district court the discretion to impose a probationary 
period in light of this Court's rulings favoring presumptive disbarment for 
misappropriation cases. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997) and In re 
Ennenga, 37 P.3d 1150 (Utah 2001). 
II. The District Court's reliance upon Dr. Anderson's testimony as 
an expert was in error because the relevant Rules of Evidence and 
Civil Procedure were not followed 
As is pointed out in the Appellee's Brief, generally an issue cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Appellee's Brief at 33. In this instance, the 
OPC raised as an issue in its opening Brief what we believe is the district court's 
plain error in relying upon Dr. Anderson's testimony as the basis for an expert 
opinion. Appellant's Brief at 35. The OPC did not raise this issue with the district 
court, because the issue didn't exist until the district court issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on November 23, 2010, after the sanctions 
phase of the proceedings. The OPC appealed from that Order, and presented Dr. 
Anderson's "expert" testimony as one of the issues on appeal. 
A party may raise for the first time on appeal an issue if it can demonstrate 
that "plain error" occurred. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at If 11. "The plain error 
exception enables the appellate court to 'balance the need for procedural 
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regularity with the demands of fairness.'" Id. at 1}13, quoting State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 112 n.12 (Utah 1989). To demonstrate plain error, it must be 
established that: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." Id., quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). All of these factors are met 
in this case. 
The OPC does not dispute Corey's statements regarding the notice we 
were provided that Dr. Anderson would be a witness and provide testimony to the 
district court. Appellee's Brief at 34-35. Dr. Anderson appeared on Corey's Trial 
Witness Designation (R.154) and was identified in Corey's discovery responses 
that are not part of the record on appeal. Id. The OPC's issue is that the district 
court then treated that testimony as expert testimony and based its Findings and 
Conclusion upon what it incorrectly referred to as Dr. Anderson's "expert" 
testimony. R. 260, 270. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) requires parties to disclose in 
advance the identity of a person who will provide testimony under Rules 702, 703 
or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Those Rules, of course, address expert 
testimony. Though Corey notified the OPC that Dr. Anderson would be a witness, 
none of the requirements of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) were followed, but, nevertheless, 
the district court treated Dr. Anderson's testimony as though it were expert and 
deemed it such in the final Findings, Conclusion and Order. This constitutes plain 
error and can properly be raised by the OPC for the first time on appeal 
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according to the test provided for in Hoigate. 1 he error clearly exists and is 
apparent in the district court's final Order, the district court knew that Dr. 
Anderson liiiull iiiinl been certified as an oxpuil, .Jin!, finally, lliere is .1 reasonable 
likelihood that had the court not relied upon the "expert" testimony there would 
t 
In his Brief, Corey discusses recent case law from this Court and its effect 
o n R ( j | e 26(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Appellee's Brief at 37-
38. As Corey notes, this Court's recent decision ii 1 Drew v. Lee, 20 1 1 U 1 15 
(March 15 2011) clarifies that a treating physician * r - ' " J " - r^ - - v expert 
r r> t 
"retained or specially employee :•-•*, . • nat case Mr Drew had 
t •• 1 5 
damages. His treating physician was identified to Ms. Lee as a expert witness 
under Rule 26(a)(3)(B), but did 1 lot prepare an expert repoi t: Id. at 1 [2, 3 I M Is, Lee 
filed a motioi 1 in limine to exclude the e>; ; ; tin ic 1 my because the treating 
physicians planned to testify regarding causanu' in addition to the care and 
treatmenl limy \MPIP piiMflini] iiillll "HI lln> ilislnil nunl tjnnfed the 1111 tinm in 
limine and excluded the testimony. Mr Drew filed and interlocutory appeal and 
this "I •nuirl IP .,/iiiist-jci Hie ilislrni court's t\xUlus,i'i m HIIIIIII stdtet) lllnaf leijijils v in,1 not 
necessary for treating physicians. Id. at p i . 
The guidance this Court pi ovided it 1 Di ew comes months after the district 
court's decision in the instant case, but, regardless, would not have been helpful 
at the time these matters were pending with the district court. Even if the Drew 
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decision had been issued before the district court ruled in Corey, it's unlikely that 
the current situation would have been avoided. In Drew, the treating doctor was 
identified as an expert, but failed to prepare a report under Rule 26(a)(3)(B). The 
OPC's issue in this case is that Dr. Anderson was never identified as a witness 
that was going to provide expert testimony. Yes, he was designated as a witness 
at trial, but because the Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure were not strictly 
followed, the OPC expected his testimony to be limited to his treatment and care 
of Corey. The OPC's questions of Dr. Anderson and his "opinions" were with 
respect to Corey's medical condition. This questioning elicited testimony 
indicating that Corey exhibited poor judgment and mood swings. That testimony 
is within the realm of what a treating physician should properly testify about. The 
OPC did not believe the district court would then treat that testimony as "expert" 
and use it as the basis for its final decision on the ultimate issue of causation for 
misappropriation (i.e., that poor judgment and mood swings are expert medical 
evidence of a causal connection to the misappropriation of funds). 
CONCLUSION 
Corey's violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct encompass the 
most serious misconduct for which an attorney can be disciplined. The district 
court failed to treat this misconduct as the presumptive disbarment case that it is, 
incorrectly deemed the misconduct only worthy of a suspension, and then 
compounded the error by incorrectly weighing the aggravation and mitigation to 
produce a result that allowed Corey to continue the practice of law uninterrupted. 
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resulted in disbarment from the practice of law. 
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